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Socrates is reported to have said that if there ever was a fellow
who in his talks with other fellows always wanted to know exactly what
he was talking about, he was, or at least he had always thought he was,
that fellow. Surely it is important to know exactly what one is talking
about. But it is not so easy to know that as might 'be supposed. There
was a maxim of the old Roman law that all definition was dangerous.
The analytical jurisprudence that undertakes to define "law" and "a
law" and the different institutions of the law precisely and to lay out
the content of systems of law in a set of thoroughly defined categories
has not proved able to tell us to the satisfaction of the present generation
of jurists what law is. Nor has the historical jurisprudence of the last
century been able to tell us with assurance what the course of its historical
development shows it must be, nor the law of nature jurisprudence what
it is because it ethically must be, nor the metaphysical jurisprudence of
the last century what it is becauses it philosophically must be.
To understand better what we shall be talking about it will be
necessary to draw a distinction.
In the beginnings of civilization men think of a wise or divinely
inspired law-giver who established canons of conduct for his people. In
time the wise or inspired personal law-giver was succeeded by a body
of wise custodians of the traditional experience of adjusting relations
and ordering conduct in increasingly civilized communities. To them
succeeded the declared wisdom of the appointed law-giving organ of
independent politically organized societies. It may be that a universal
political organization of the world with a universal law-declaring organ
may be the next step. But as the legal order matures, we have to think
of law, not merely of laws, or of law as only an aggregate of laws. We
more and more think of principles discovered by wisdom applied to experi-
ence and experience organized by reason.
Moses, Manu, Lycurgus, Numa gave laws to peoples in the form
of rules of conduct, as is well brought out in Jethro's admonition to
Moses: "And thou shall give them ordinances and laws and shalt show
them the way wherein they must walk and the work that they must do."
Something of the same idea may be seen in the mythical ascription of the
foundation of the common law of England to Alfred.
In the popular idea law is thought of in terms of the criminal law.
Tony Weller firmly believed that the Old Bailey was the court of last
resort and that the appropriate defense to a civil action for damages
* Professor Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
f This address ,was delivered on .April 26, 1958, at the annual Law Day of
The Ohio State College of Law. [Ed.]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
was an alibi. Indeed to the bulk of the population law means policing
and the traffic court, as the tribunal with which it is most familiar,
stands for the type. Television, portraying criminal trials and violent
encounters, makes policing appear as the legal order of society. The
dramatic ceremony by which a legal proceeding began in the formal
action at law in the older Roman law brings this out. It pictures a violent
quarrel in the course of which the King, as a magnified chief of police
in the small town of the regal period, called out mittete ambo, "let go
both of you" and, each having stated his claim, pronounced "let Titius
be judge." The magistrate's function was one of policing. The legal
order was a system of policing a small country town.
Policing is a local function. A policing theory of law is, therefore,
a local theory.
Beseler spoke of an idea of local sovereignty, by a term which I
like to translate "mainstreetism," as characteristic of the peoples of
northern Europe. It is characteristic of our Anglo-American common law
in the form of political faith in home rule and a legal cult of local law,
in contrast to the faith in universal law which, after the reception of
Roman law as developed by the classical jurists of the empire from the
first to the third century, became the civil-law system of Continental
Europe.
Very likely you may feel that I shall do no better by a sociological
method. Certainly sociological method has not been or become fashion-
able with jurists and perhaps I can claim no more for it than that we
should at least treat the science of law as one of the social sciences.
Perhaps it is enough to say assuredly what law is not. For there is only
mischief in the proposition of the analytical school that law is an aggre-
gate of laws.
According to Austin, the founder of English analytical jurispru-
dence, a law is a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being
by an intelligent being having power over him. Law is an aggregate
of rules thus established. But what we really have to be talking about
is the legal order-in French ordre juridique, in German Rechtsordnung
-the process of adjusting relations and ordering conduct in civilized
society in accordance with precepts derived from experience developed
by reason and reason tested by experience. The difference between "law"
and "a law" is not so brought out in our English terminology as it is in
the Latin zus and lex, the French droit and loi, or the German Recht and
Gesetz. There is a certain plausibility in saying that law is an aggregate
of laws which does not impress us if we are told that droit is an aggregate
of lois, or Recht an aggregate of Gesetze. The words ius, droit, Recht,
express an idea of what is right and just and hence suggest law as some-
thing which has got beyond the stage of the police state, whereas lex, loi,
Gesetz express an idea of what is commanded, or literally laid down, and




Juristically or juridically found general principles are inadequate to
special local needs as legislative making of laws is inadequate to the tasks
of a system of general law. A striking example is afforded by American
experience of utilizing the water of running streams. Where streams with
a steady regular flow of water of sufficient quantity to admit of use by
many are at hand, the problem of admitting the widest possible use of
natural media by the most of those who are in a position to use and
desire to use them, of satisfying the most reasonable expectations we can
with the least friction and waste, is met by limiting use of the water to
owners along the banks and limiting use by each to what will allow of
like use by all. But if applied to arid regions in some states this would
have the effect of preventing any effective use by any one of such water
as is at hand. In such cases special local geographical conditions call for
special legislative rules in place of the principle ascertained by experience
developed by reason in the process of adjudication which obtains generally
both in the Anglo-American common law and in the civil law of Conti-
nental Europe and Latin America. It is significant, moreover, that the
local legislative rules differ widely in the different jurisdictions which
depart from the principle of the Anglo-American common law and the
Continental civil law, although there may be common conditions in the
divergence which call for local legislation.
It is true that the function of laws, as distinguished from law, is not
confined to the exigencies of the police state. A law is a rule. That is,
it is a precept prescribing a definite detailed consequence for a definite
detailed fact or state of facts. Such precepts are called for even in the
most advanced societies where local economic, historical, or ethnic con-
ditions, sometimes more compelling at least for a time, as local goo-
graphical conditions require differentiation of particular regions or districts
or communities.
The Germanic peoples that set up local kingdoms after the downfall
of the Roman empire brought back a regime of legal localism. This
gave way before the revived study of Roman law in the universities after
the twelfth century and consequent reception of Roman law on the Con-
tinent after the fifteenth century. Universal thinking about law was
given vogue by the law-of-nature jurists after Grotius (1625). But it
only scratched the surface in England, and the rise of the English
analytical jurisprudence after the middle of the nineteenth century effaced
the scratches. As late as 1901, Maitland could say, in his lectures on
English Law and the Renaissance: "We have all been nationalists of late.
Cosmopolitanism can afford to wait its turn."
Laws are rules. But law makes use of principles, i.e., authoritative
starting points for legal reasoning; conceptions, i.e., precepts defining
categories of fact or situation to which certain rules, principles or standards
are to be applied (e.g., sale, bailment, trust) ; and standards, i.e., measures
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of conduct instead of rules prescribing or proscribing details of action.
What the jurist must insist upon is that the vital, the enduring part
of the law is in principles, starting points for legal reasoning, not in
rules. Principles remain relatively constant or develop along constant
lines. Rules are relatively short-lived. They do not develop. They are
repealed or are superseded 'by other rules.
Recently I had occasion to study legislation of Illinois under its
Constitution of 1848 and its present Constitution of 1870. Two statutes
attracted my notice: one providing a bounty for killing wolves and one
against setting fire to the prairie. The former did not prove ever to
have raised a question calling for a reported decision. The supreme court
of the state had occasion twice to decide cases involving prairie fires, but
decided them on general principles of the law of negligence, not upon
the statute. Here we have examples of special local conditions calling
for rules and of the relation of such conditions to the law. Wolves and
prairie fires were local conditions of pioneer Illinois. The rules provided
for those conditions disappeared with them and left no mark upon the
law. The general proposition as to care in the course of individual con-
duct and casting of risk of injury on others and the standard of care
and principle of liability for conduct not in accord therewith have re-
mained unaffected.
Advancing civilization brings with it law, and with law there come
to be law schools. "Law schools," said Maitland, "make tough law."
As they develop they teach law, not laws; principles not rules. They
train practicing lawyers who -become skilled in application of principles
and standards and in principles of interpretation and application of rules.
"No later movement-not the. Renaissance, not the Reformation,"
so Maitland tells us, "draws a stronger line across the annals of mankind
than that which is drawn about the year 1100 when a human science
[of law] won a place beside theology." When in place of the divinely
inspired law giver men began to think of the wise custodian of the receiv-
ed customs of a people, there began to be law, which could be taught
and studied. The outstanding examples are the Roman law, taught,
commented upon and expounded in treatises by a long succession of jurists
from the fourth century B.C. to the time of Diocletian-roughly six
hundred years-which culminated in the Digest of Justinian (A.D. 533)
and the English common law. The latter was taught and studied by a
succession of practicing lawyers probably from the time of Edward I
(thirteenth century). The common law so taught and developed in a
long course of reported judicial decisions from the thirteenth century to
the present, has not been reduced to legislative form by codification ex-
cept in three of the United States where, however, the codes so far as
they have to do with the everyday administration of justice in the society
of today have in effect been treated as declaratory. Moreover the legis-
lation of Justinian became a subject of study and teaching in the Italian
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universities of the twelfth century, and was taught, commented upon
and thus developed by jurists till a new era of codification set in at the
end of the eighteenth century. But the codification of this era, like that
of Justinian, was law declaring rather than lawmaking. Absolutist politi-
cal thinking in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to political
ideas of law as something made out of whole cloth by the sovereign in
the form of rules or commands. Law was the will of the sovereign;
finding of law by juristic study and judicial experience was in contra-
vention of the sovereign lawmaking function. The code of Frederick
the Great (1728) and the Prussian code following it (1791) forbade
even interpretation by the courts. If the meaning was not clear, the
question was to be referred to the Code Commission for an authoritative
answer. The French Civil Code of 1804 and the Austrian Code of
1811 forbade the judges deciding cases by way of a general disposition
Cor so as to formulate a rule." Even in the common-law world we
used to hear declamation against "judicial legislation" when legislative
texts were unclear or wanting or there were no governing precedents.
But the practical exigencies of administering justice according to law
have required this mode of thought to be given up. Indeed the French
Civil Code, which was the model for nearly a century, was character-
istically more declaratory of principles -than a book of rules.
In the revision of the French Civil Code now in progress, the pro-
vision forbidding judicial finding of law and confining the courts to
genuine interpretation and application of actual texts, which had become
practically obsolete, are now replaced by provisions as to the materials
which the courts may use in judicial law finding in the course of decision.
This device, already adopted in the German Civil Code of 1900, has
been finding its way into all recent codes and marks a definite giving up
of the idea that law can only be a body of laws; that legal precepts
must be rules of legislative origin.
In truth, the idea that law is a body of laws--of rules laid down
by the lawmaking organ of a politically organized society-an idea long
urged by analytical jurists and assumed not uncommonly by writers on
political science in the past, is at variance with the actual course of the
administration of justice according to law in the civilized world as it
has been since the Roman law was the law of the world in antiquity
and the Civil Law and the Common Law became the dominant systems
in the world of today.
With the expansion and unification of the economic order it be-
comes a chief problem of the science of law to maintain a balance be-
tween the general and the local. In the science of politics it is a problem of
adjusting a general ordering of society as a whole and local self govern-
ment. In jurisprudence it is one of universal principles for guiding the gen-
eral adjusting of relations and ordering of conduct of life in society, on the
one hand, and on the other hand, of prescribing detailed rules to meet
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local exceptional conditions. The two fields are quite distinct. But they
merge along a boundary not always easy to draw with exactness. There
is a tendency to stress general principles, on the one hand, or detailed
rules, on the other hand, according to historically drawn lines of the
time and place. Hence detailed legislation shaped to local modes of
thought of the past may hamper judicial working out and application of
principles. On the other hand, judicially found and formulated prin-
ciples may confuse the application of salutary rules for local administra-
tion. It is here, it may be remarked in passing, that there is likely to be a
difficult obstacle to overcome in -the quest of a law of the world to which
your generation may well be looking forward. To work out a theory
of the relation of local legislation and administration to unified principles
of law for an economically unified world may be a compelling task for
the jurists of tomorrow.
Since the classical Greek philosophers and the Roman jurists who
were their pupils, men have sought a solution of the task of adjusting
the local to the general in law by means of a theory of natural law.
This theory of a universal ideal, of which the body of legal precepts
anywhere is to be only a reflection, has played a great part in the history
of law. But systems of natural law in the past have been idealized
versions of the body of established legal precepts of the time and place.
I have been in the habit of calling them systems of positive natural law.
Whether a natural natural law can be laid out by some jurist of to-
morrow, who can shake off the supposed ideal propositions in which he
has been trained, I will not attempt to prophesy. I submit, however, that
we are likely to achieve more in the endeavor to bring the law of our
generation up to the requirements of the time than in ambitious attempts
to lay out a system adequate to the juristic needs of the world for time
to come.
Let me repeat, the enduring part of the apparatus of administering
justice is in principles, not in rules. This was well brought out in Jethro's
admonition to Moses. He was not to threaten or command. He was to
show the people the way in which they were to walk and the work that
they were to do. The commandments did not proceed from a sovereign
human legislator.
History of law begins when crude attempts to organize social con-
trol through limitation of self help in kin-organized society take form
in a legal order. We may recognize four stages of development from
that point. I have been in the habit of calling them: (1) the strict law,
(2) equity and natural law, (3) the maturity of law, and (4)" the
socialization of law. They may -be characterized thus. In the stage of
the strict law, which is represented in Roman law by the ;us ciuile or law
of the old city, and in our own system by the common law as opposed
to equity, law as distinguished from religion and morals has definitely
prevailed as the primary regulating agency of society. Normally men
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apply only to the appointed agencies of the law to redress wrongs. Hence
the body of rules determining the cases in which men may appeal to these
recognized or appointed agencies for help comes to define indirectly the
substance of rights and thus indirectly to point out and limit the interests
secured. In this stage fear of arbitrary exercise of the power of public
help for individual victims of wrong operates to produce a narrowly
limited system. The chief end which the legal order seeks is certainty.
Hence the cases in which the legal order will interfere and the manner
in which its interference may be invoked are defined by a body of wholly
hard and fast rules. In this stage law is a body of rules and the rules
are wholly inelastic and inflexible.
A stage of liberalization, which I have called the stage of equity
and natural law, succeeds the strict law. This stage is represented in
Roman law by the period of the ius gentium (law of nations---ie., of the
neighboring peoples with whom the Romans had business and social
relations) and ius naturale (natural law). In English and Anglo-Ameri-
can law it is represented by the rise of the Court of Chancery and devel-
opment of equity. In the law of Continental Europe it is represented
by the period of the law-of-nature school of jurists, the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. The watchword of the stage of the strict law
was certainty. The watchword of this stage is morality or some phrase
of ethical import, such as good conscience, aequum et bonum or natural
law. The former insists upon uniformity, the latter upon morality; the
former upon form, the latter upon substance, by which it means justice
in the ethical sense; the former on remedies, the latter on duties; the
former on rule, the latter on reason. The capital ideas of the stage of
equity and natural law are identification of law with morals, the concep-
tion of duty and attempts to make moral duties into legal duties. It
relies upon reasoned ethical principles rather than upon arbitary rules to
keep down caprice and the personal element in the administration of
justice.
As the result of a stiffening process, by which the undue fluidity of
the application of law and the over-wide scope for discretion involved
in the identification of law and morals are gradually corrected, there
comes to be a body of law with the certain and stable qualities of the
strict law yet liberalized by the conceptions developed by equity and nat-
ural law. In the stage of what has -been called the maturity of law the
watchwords are equality and security. The former idea is derived from
the insistence of equity and natural law upon treating all human beings
as legal persons and upon recognizing full legal capacity in all persons
possessed of normal wills, and partly from the insistence of the strict
law that the same remedy shall always be applied to the same state of
facts. Accordingly equality is taken to include two things: Equality
of operation of rules of law and equality of opportunity to exercise one's
faculties and employ one's substance. The idea of security is derived
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from the strict law, but is modified by ideas of equity and natural law,
especially the idea of insisting upon will rather than form as the cause
of legal results and idea of preventing enrichment of one at the expense
of another through form and without will. In consequence security
included two things. The idea that every one is to be secured in his
interests against aggression by others, and the idea that others are to be
permitted to acquire from him or exact from him only through his will
that they do so or through his breach of rules devised to secure others
in like interests.
In order to insure equality the maturity of law again insists strongly
upon certainty and in consequence this stage is comparable in many respects
to the stage of the strict law. It is greatly in advance of the strict law,
however, because it insists not merely on equality of legal remedies but
on equality of rights, that is, equality of capacities of controlling actions
of others :through the legal order, and conceives of application of remedies
as only a means thereto. To insure security the maturity of law insists
upon property and contract as fundamental ideas.
At the end of the nineteenth century a significant change was begin-
ning to be manifest throughout the world. In economics there was a
giving up of the classical political economy. In politics there was the
rise of the social service state. In jurisprudence there was growing
recognition of interests as the ultimate idea behind legal rights. Jurists
came to think of so-called natural rights as something quite distinct in
character from legal rights; that they are claims and expectations which
human beings may reasonably assert, whereas legal rights are means
which the legal order employs to give effect to such claims within
certain defined limits. But when natural rights are put in this way it
becomes evident that these individual interests get their significance for
jurisprudence from a social interest in giving them effect. In consequence
the emphasis has come to be transferred gradually from individual inter-
ests to social interests under which they may be subsumed. Such a move-
ment may be seen in the law of all countries today. Its watchword is
satisfaction of so much of human claims or demands or expectations
as we can with the least sacrifice of particular expectations. This stage
of legal development has been called the socialization of law.
Some examples of the socialization of law will serve to mark its
significance. One of the first to appear was limitation of the use of
property, forbidding exercise of some of the legal liberties of an owner.
Also there have come to be limitations on the owner's power of disposing of
his property, imposed to protect interests of members of his family. Also
the law as to trespass upon land has been more and more relaxed. There
has been a tendency to give effect to a social interest in conservation of
social resources by restriction of the individual's power of acquisition.
There has come to be much limitation of freedom of contract by pre-
scribing standard contracts or standard clauses, prescribing terms of
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employment and modes of employment bargaining. Contracts are increas-
ingly made over in order to make more equitable the terms agreed on by
the parties. There is increasing extension of liability to make reparation
for personal injuries because of the mechanizing of activities of every
sort and employment of agencies likely to get out of hand and threaten
the social interest in the general security. More and more public funds
are required to respond for injuries to individuals by public agencies and
the legal immunities of states, municipalities, officials, and hospitals are
everywhere given up. In securing the social interest in the individual life,
limitations are imposed upon the power of a creditor or an injured person
to obtain full satisfaction from one who has dependents for a debt or
liability to repair an injury. Individual interests in the domestic relations
are limited in order to secure the social interest in dependents. There is
a tendency to modify the purely contentious conception of litigation by
one of adjustment of interests.
Here we are at the moment. But there is no reason to suppose that
the response of the legal order to advancing civilization will stop here.
I do not profess to prophesy. But there is much to suggest that we may
be moving toward a further stage which may be one of a law of the
world.
For the examples of socialization of law I have given are significant
of judicially or juristically worked out principles that give them their real
meaning. As they take shape in the legal order they are not rules made
to conditions peculiar to time and place by legislative organs of a politically
organized society. In successive stages of development of the legal order
each later stage builds upon the preceding stage. To the principle of
certainty established by the strict law, the stage of equity and natural law
adds the upholding of morals, the maturity of law adds to both the
promoting and maintairiing of the demands or expectations of the individ-
ual human being, and to all this the socialization of law is adding the
promoting and maintaining of the expectations common to all men in
a crowded and mechanized world where we must live and move and
have our being in cooperation with our fellow men. May it not be
that the watchword of the next stage may be some derivative of the
word "humanity"?
When I look back, to the law which I studied in law school in 1889
and sought to practice when I came to the bar in 1890, what impresses
me most is the change that has come over the law in the giving up of
the extreme localism of the American lawyer of the last century. There
was and long had been a cult of the local law. I well remember that
as late as 1903 a book published by a bar examiner for an important
state exhorted the student to study carefully the statutes of the state,
especially those relating to practice and procedure in the courts, because,
he explained, it was established that of all bodies of law, the laws of that
state were the very best. This attitude was 'by no means confined to
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particular common-law jurisdictions. In reaction from the eighteenth-
century idea of all positive law as a reflection of an ideal body of rules
of natural law of universal and eternal validity, it seemed to be held
as a matter of course that the laws of the time and place were the law;
that they had a sufficient basis in the local political sovereignty, and that
they could be thought of adequately in terms of that sovereignty. Its
political independence explained and justified itself as well as all the
details of its lawmaking.
Blackstone had defined a law as a rule of civil conduct prescribed
by the supreme power in a state. The law of property was a body of
rules. They could be thought of in this fashion, and as most of them
had come down from an age of strict law and the law of property in
land has always been thought of as calling specially for strict rules, taking
them for the type of legal precepts had bad consequences for the Anglo-
American law of torts from which our law has not been delivered wholly
even today.
The law of torts was first taught as a body of rules-of rules
defining the name torts: rules as to assault and battery, false imprison-
ment, malicious prosecution, slander, and libel. As short a time ago as
when I was a student in law school, liability for negligence was not
thought of clearly as a matter of principle and standard. Even Holmes
at one time looked forward to seeing it reduced to rules analogous to
those determining estates in land or the rules as to succession in case of
intestacy. There were rules as to negligence per se. Standing on the
back platform of a moving car, holding one's elbow out of the window
of a moving car, getting on or off a moving train, no matter what the
circumstances, were in themselves by rule of law negligence. Rules of
this sort were applied to railroad accidents as late as 1903, but are now
given up as rules almost everywhere. Today we think not of a tort of
negligent conduct, defined and governed in its application by rules, but
of a principle of liability for casting an unreasonable risk of injury
upon another.
Trade and commerce have always been a force for breaking down
barriers and setting human relations free from fixed burdens imposed
by political organizatio9i. What of such burdens still holds on is being
done away with by air transportation which has been making the most
remote regions next door neighbors of each other.
But in the law of today the most effective solvent of detailed rules,
statutory definitions and rigid statutory fixed categories, has been the
multiplicity of new instrumentalities of danger to life and limb in the
doing of everything by machinery that was formerly done by hand; the
highly organized industrial activities in which one must encounter not
men but machinery and has to reckon with dangers far beyond individual
intentional aggression or ill motivated want of care. When what used
to be done in the home with a spinning wheel is done in a textile mills
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involving new relations of employer and employee, new problems of
corporate organization, of conflict of public and private interest, of new
problems of health, safety and welfare of groups of co-workers, and of
conflict of interest among groups of co-workers, and of conflicts between
groups instead of between single individuals, the whole picture of adjust-
ing relations and ordering conduct has to be changed radically, and this
has had to be done in decades where development of legal institutions
and doctrines and technique had gone on slowly for centuries. Today
baking and cooking that used to be done in the home are done in fac-
tories. As it has -been said, the housewife of today cooks with a can
opener. What used to go directly from the household garden to the
household cook and thence to the table now goes from the industrialized
superfarm to the factory, to the manufacturer, to the wholesaler, to the
retailer, to the housewife, with problems as to warranty, intervening or
supervening negligence and causation which our courts have to dispose
of as well as they can with the simple terminology and categories of
the past.
Again, compare the farming of the times in which our law was
formative with the rising industrialized agriculture of today. It is not
merely a matter of comparing reaping and threshing with sickle, cradle,
and flail, as in my grandfather's time, with the mechanical process by
combined reaper and threshing machine, or comparing the cutting and
stacking of hay with scythe and pitchfork of my boyhood with the
mowing and stacking machinery and hay-baling machines of today. The
old-time farmer, farming his own farm with the help of his hired man,
the individual agriculture of yesterday, with its simple relations of one
man with another man, is coming to be replaced by an industrial agri-
culture which has raised questions analogous to those raised by mill and
factory, such as the "simple tool rule" for the farm to parallel the
"assumption of risk rule." What once applied to the factory is taken over
for the great fruit farms, and industrial agriculture and orchard opera-
tion on a large scale are calling for workmen's compensation for agri-
cultural injuries. These changes, which are still going on, call for a
remaking of the law of liability in order to secure social interests in need
of more effective securing than afforded by what sufliced well enough
for the simple individual farmer of yesterday.
Also compare travel today with the conditions of travel for which
our law of liability was worked out in the formative era. Compare the
family horse and buggy and the farm wagon with the automobile of
today; the delivery wagon with the motor truck; the stage coach with
the railroad now that streamlined trains are run on four to six track
roads at one hundred miles an hour. Compare even this last with the
motor bus and the airplane. The slaughter on the highways on holidays,
which rises to the proportions of the battlefield, raises problems beyond
what lawmaker or law writer could think of in the era of policing and
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of the criminal law. Indeed how to organize, provide suitable judges
for, and equip traffic courts adds to the sufficiently difficult problems of
organization of courts in the states.
If transition from horse power to steam power made trouble for
my father's generation when called on to measure principles of legal
liability, and transition from steam power to gasoline power makes trouble
for mine, what shall we say of the troubles ahead for your generation
when it is called upon to wrestle with problems of liability for injuries
inflicted -by atomic powered machinery?
But injuries to life and limb in industry and in the course of travel
are by no means the whole story. For example, we are told that provision
for the calculated number of killed and injured in the course of con-
structing a modern building in the metropolitan city of today is now
reckoned as an item in the cost.
In the Anglo-Saxon law we are told of the safety of the home-
sitting man. The law secured him while he was in his house. The house
peace-the exemption of the house from violence in breach of the peace
-was under the protection of the whole body of the free men of the
community. He was safe so long as he stayed in his own home. Else-
where he must expect to be with dangers compassed round. Gradually
a system of peaces was evolved to protect him from intentional aggres-
sion in most of the serious occupations which might take him out of doors.
In time there was general legal protection against attack by others. But
the system of legal protection from intentional attack from which our
law has developed is no longer adequate to secure even the home-sitting
man. Motor trucks and cars crash into houses. Airplanes plunge into
them or explode and bombard them. The superseding of water power
by electric power has created a new menace in the high tension wires,
crossing field and highway, which ,become displaced by storm or accident
and inflict the most terrifying injuries. The multiplication of means of
injury even to one who is abiding quietly in his own home, calls for
rethinking the principles of liability.
In the old writ in the common-law action of trespass s4 et arzms
it was set forth .that the defendant attacked the plaintiff with swords,
staves, and knives. But swords and knives did not go off half cocked
nor was it necessary while handling staves and spears to be careful to
be sure that they were not loaded. Even a -bow and arrow had a short
range. They could not kill at a thousand yards.
It long ago proved hopeless to frame and reframe rules to keep
pace with the development of means of inflicting injury.
As I said a generation ago, and it is even more palpable today,
law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still. The very essence of life
is movement and the living organism cannot stand forever changeless
and survive. Law which governs life must change as life changes. But
this does not mean that you are to be discouraged by thinking that what
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you have laboriously learned as law is something fleeting that will pass
away. As Coke put it, in the time when the medieval land law was
being made a foundation for the law of modern England, that was to
become the law of the English-speaking world, "out of the old fields
must grow the new corn." The law of tomorrow will not -be made out
of whole cloth by the legislative fiat of an omnicompetent lawgiver. It
will be made as law in living and growing societies has always been
made, -by juristic and judicial application of reason to experience of the
administration of justice in the past and testing of that reason by further
experience of the administration of justice according to law.
Thus there will be abundance of work for each and all of you to do
in helping bring the law of your day abreast and keeping it abreast of
its tasks, as its tasks change from age to age. I have put one example
of what there will be for you to help do in the law as to liability. There
is work to be done in that part of the law, beyond what I have suggested,
in assuring a balance of the security of the individual life and of free
individual self assertion. For free individual self assertion is basic to the
economic order. The individual lawyer by thorough performance of his
duty of advising his clients and advocating their causes is a builder of
the law. For the law is built in this way. It grows through the everyday
work of the lawyers.
Each of you will have abundant opportunity, as practitioner,- as
judge, as law teacher, or as legislator to contribute to the work of advanc-
ing the administration of justice. If, as Daniel Webster declared, justice
is the great interest of man on earth, you are assured of no mean role
in life in promoting and maintaining that interest.
It may even be that your generation may see the advent of a law
of the world--something which prophets, kings, philosophers, statesmen,
and even poets have foretold or planned or urged or striven to bring
about.
One cannot put this better than did Sir Frederick Pollock in his
lectures to the students of law at Oxford:
So venerable, so majestic is this living temple of justice,
this immemorial and yet ever freshly growing fabric of the
common law, that the least of us is happy who may hereafter
point to so much as one stone thereof and say, the work of
my hands is there.
Possibilities of work for your hands are and even more will be
opening on every side of an increasingly complex legal order, as it moves
toward a legal order of the world. In his every day practice the well
trained, zealous and courageous lawyer of tomorrow, mindful of his
calling to promote the chief interest of man on earth, may find more
than one place where he may contribute one stone toward advancement
of justice among men.
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